One trend that lenders are encountering with increasing frequency is borrowers choosing to represent themselves in court. Whether driven by rising legal costs or personal choice, litigants in person are now a common feature of mortgage enforcement proceedings. While the legal principles remain unchanged, the practical realities of dealing with an unrepresented borrower can make proceedings more complicated.
A recent High Court judgment, Louis v Topaz Finance Ltd and others [2026] EWHC 1437 (Ch), provides useful guidance for lenders, particularly those involved in enforcing security and appointing Law of Property Act receivers.
The case arose after a borrower sought to remove receivers appointed over her London property. She argued that the lender had agreed to accept reduced mortgage payments for a temporary period and had also agreed to remove the receivers once certain conditions had been met. However, the trial judge found there was no evidence of either agreement beyond the borrower's own recollection. Against that stood extensive contemporaneous records, including recordings and transcripts of telephone conversations, which simply did not support her account.
Having lost at trial, the borrower appealed. Importantly, she did not argue that the judge had misunderstood the law or reached the wrong conclusion on the evidence. Instead, she claimed that the hearing itself had been procedurally unfair.
Her appeal relied on several arguments. She said the judge had decided too early that documentary evidence would always carry more weight than oral evidence, had failed to give her a proper opportunity to present her case at the start of the hearing and had overlooked part of her pleaded case.
The High Court rejected each of those arguments. It confirmed that appeals based on procedural unfairness face a deliberately high threshold. It is not enough to show that something could have been handled better. The irregularity must be serious and it must have made the outcome unjust.
Looking at the transcript, the court found that the trial judge had heard the borrower's evidence at length before reaching his conclusions. While he ultimately preferred the documentary evidence, that was because it was supported by extensive contemporaneous records rather than because he had dismissed oral evidence out of hand.
The court also found that, although the borrower had not been invited to make formal opening submissions, she was later given every opportunity to explain her case during closing submissions. She was even allowed additional time and permitted to introduce further documents. Taken as a whole, the hearing remained fair.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the judgment is that the High Court was prepared to criticise the trial judge's approach while still dismissing the appeal. Mr Justice Thompsell accepted that the judge's treatment of the litigant in person was often abrupt and did not meet the standards expected under the Equal Treatment Bench Book. Even so, he concluded that those shortcomings had not prevented the borrower from presenting her case or undermined the fairness of the proceedings.
Bridging lenders can derive several lessons from this.
First, good record keeping continues to be one of the strongest forms of protection available. In this case, the lender's detailed documentary evidence, including recorded telephone calls, proved decisive when set against disputed recollections of conversations said to have taken place years earlier.
Secondly, lenders should expect to encounter more litigants in person as enforcement activity continues. While judges will often take additional care to explain procedures to unrepresented parties, this does not lower the legal threshold for challenging enforcement action or create a different standard of evidence.
Finally, the judgment serves as a reminder that professionalism matters throughout the enforcement process. Courts expect litigants in person to be treated fairly and with patience, but fairness does not require lenders to compromise their position. Where communications have been properly documented, decisions clearly recorded and the evidence consistently maintained throughout the life of the loan, lenders remain in a strong position to defend enforcement action.
Ultimately, *Louis v Topaz* is reassuring for lenders. It confirms that courts will continue to place significant weight on reliable contemporaneous evidence and will not overturn properly reasoned decisions simply because an unrepresented borrower believes the process could have been handled differently.
Although AI played no part in this case, we are seeing increasing numbers of debtors naively relying on it as a cheaper and more reliable alternative to obtaining legal advice. It is not. In my view, one consequence is a growing number of debtors choosing to represent themselves in mortgage enforcement proceedings.
The courts will generally adopt a tolerant approach to litigants in person who do not fully understand court procedure or fail to meet procedural deadlines. That does not change the eventual outcome where the evidence supports the lender's position, but it can increase the length, complexity and cost of disputes for everyone involved.
As more borrowers appear without legal representation, that combination of careful record keeping, fair conduct and robust evidence will become increasingly important.
